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SURVEY SECTION
Public Immunity. St. James Condominium Ass'n v. Lokey, 676
A.2d 1343 (R.I. 1996). Dismissal of action for failure to state a
claim is disfavored where defendant asserts immunity under pub-
lic-duty doctrine, and where plaintiffs pleadings sufficiently allege
that a town owed a special duty.
In St. James Condominium Ass'n v. Lokey, 1 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reversed a superior court judgment that granted a
motion to dismiss a negligence claim against a town and a building
inspector. The supreme court held that dismissal for failure to
state a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6)2 was inappropriate
where a town claimed immunity under the public-duty doctrine be-
cause of the possibility of the existence of a special duty to the
plaintiffs.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiffs, owners of units in the St. James Condominium de-
velopment in North Providence, sued the developer of the project,
the architect, the warranty company, the Town of North Provi-
dence (Town), and the building inspector alleging, inter alia, that
the inspector had "negligently inspected or failed to inspect the
plans and construction of the project and had negligently issued
occupancy permits for units within the development."4 The com-
plaint also charged the Town with liability for the negligence of its
public officials under the doctrine of respondeat superior.5 The
Town and the building inspector filed a motion to dismiss claiming
immunity under the public-duty doctrine.6 In opposition to the
motion, plaintiffs submitted an occupancy permit and an inspec-
tion form for one of the condominium buildings that stated "[n]eed
smoke stops between units[,] [s]tairs need re-building no overhang
1. 676 A.2d 1343 (L.I. 1996).
2. A claim may be dismissed "for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted." 1RI. Super. Ct. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
3. St. James, 676 A.2d at 1347.
4. Id. at 1344. Plaintiffs claimed that there were major defects in the build-
ing including settling foundations, cracked walls, frozen pipes, a leaking roof, and
improper heating, and that the building inspector should have revealed the build-
ing code violations. Id.
5. The doctrine provides that a master is liable for the wrongful acts of his
servant. Black's Law Dictionary 1311 (6th ed. 1990).
6. The public-duty doctrine protects governmental functions from tort liabil-
ity. St. James, 676 A.2d at 1346.
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Boiler rooms." 7 The defendants' motion was granted, and plaintiffs
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court claiming that the
special duty exception to the public-duty doctrine applied to this
case, and dismissal was an abuse of discretion."
BACKGROUTND
In several prior cases, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the "public-duty doctrine protects the state and its political
subdivisions from tort liability arising out of the performance of
governmental functions not commonly undertaken by private enti-
ties."9 An exception to the public-duty doctrine existed where the
governmental unit owed a special duty to an individual instead of
the public in general.10 Plaintiffs could show a special duty if there
had been "some form of prior contact with state or municipal offi-
cials 'who then knowingly embarked on a course of conduct that
endangered the plaintiffs, or they [knew] that the injury to that
particularly identified plaintiff can be or should have been
foreseen.'" '
Another exception to the public-duty doctrine is created where
the state's actions are so extreme that it would not be necessary for
a plaintiff to show that the government owed them a special
duty. 2 In Haley v. Town of Lincoln,13 the court noted that it
would be virtually impossible for a defendant to sustain its burden
in a motion to dismiss under either Rule 12(c) or 12(b)(6) because
of the possibility of these exceptions.' 4 A motion to dismiss under
7. Id. at 1345.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1346 (citing Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I. 1992);
Bierman v. Shookster, 590 K-2d 402, 403 (R.I. 1991)). The intent of the doctrine is
to "encourage the effective administration of governmental operations by removing
the threat of potential litigation." Haley, 611 A.2d at 849 (citing Catone v.
Medberry, 555 A.2d 328, 333 (R.I. 1989)).
10. St. James, 676 A.2d at 1346 (citing Haley, 611 A.2d at 849; Ryan v. State
Dep't of Transp., 420 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I. 1980)).
11. IM at 1345 (quoting Quality Court Condominium Assn v. Quality Hill
Dev. Corp., 641 A.2d 746, 750 (R.I. 1985)).
12. Haley, 611 A.2d at 849 (citing Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65 (LI. 1991)).
This exception, known as the egregious conduct exception, was not claimed as a
defense in St. James.
13. 611 A.2d 845 (IL 1992).
14. St. James, 676 A-2d at 1346 (quoting Haley, 611 A.2d at 849). The court in
Haley was referring to Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c),
which is a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Rule 12(b)(6), which is a
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Rule 12(b)(6) "assumes the allegations contained in the complaint
to be true and views the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs."15 It would be a rare circumstance when the pleadings
are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff that such
motions could succeed.' 6 "[S]uch a motion should not be granted
'unless it appears to a certainty that [the plaintiffs] will not be en-
titled to relief under any set of facts which might be proved in sup-
port of [their] claim.' " 17
ANALysIs AND HOLDING
In St. James, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first had to de-
termine whether the trial judge had considered the defendants'
motion to dismiss as a failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), or as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.18 In
this regard, the court noted that although the plaintiffs submitted
two documents extrinsic to the pleadings, the motion judge "made
no reference to the matters outside the pleadings when she ruled
on the motion."' 9 On this basis, the court reviewed the judgment as
a judgment to dismiss, and next considered the question of
whether the dismissal was proper. 20
motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"
Haley, 611 A.2d at 850 n.2.
15. St. James, 676 A.2d at 1346 (citing Builders Specialty Co. v. Goulet, 639
A.2d 59, 60 (RI. 1994); Ellis v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 586 A.2d 1055,
1057 (RI. 1991)).
16. Id. at 1347.
17. Id. (quoting Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 227 A.2d 582, 584
(RLI. 1967)).
18. "If on a motion [under 12(b)(6)] to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, [it] shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." R.I. Super. Ct R. Civ. P.
12(bX6).
19. St. James, 676 A.2d at 1345. This dispute arose because the defendants
argued that the motion as granted was actually one for summary judgment,
although they had written the order (including the caption), that the trial judge
signed. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court pointed out in its opinion, not only did
the judge not reference these documents in her opinion, "[t~he plaintiffs... were
not notified, as required by Rule 12(b)(6), that defendants' motion was being con-
verted into a motion for summary judgment." IM at 1345-46. When a motion to
dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment, "'all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by
Rule 56." IM at 1345 (quoting lI. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
20. Id.
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In considering whether to affirm the motion to dismiss pursu-
ant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on its
prior holdings regarding the public immunity defense.2 ' The court
did not depart from the test it had articulated in Bragg v. Warwick
Shoppers World, Inc.,22 which stated that a motion for dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) "should not be granted 'unless it appears to a
certainty that [the plaintiffs] will not be entitled to relief under any
set of facts which might be proved in support of [their] claim.'" 23
The court affirmed that motions to dismiss based on the public-
duty doctrine are especially disfavored. 24
The court noted that there was enough ambiguity in the record
to question whether the plaintiffs could show that defendants owed
them a special duty.25 Relying on Haley, the court said that "[i]t is
possible to conceive of fact[s] that, if proven... at trial, could es-
tablish the existence of a special duty owed by a defendant to that
plaintiff" 26 The court went on to note that the plaintiffs' complaint
indicated several incidents wherein the defendant building inspec-
tor had failed in his duty to properly inspect the construction, had
noted code violations, and yet had issued occupancy permits "when
he knew or should have known they were in violation of the appro-
priate building codes."27 Finally, the court noted that even though
"these allegations are insufficient to establish the existence of a
special duty, they do not preclude the possibility that such a duty
existed."28
In reversing the motion judge's ruling, the court stated that
because this case did "not present one of the rare circumstances in
which the plaintiffs' pleadings leave no doubt whatsoever that
[they] could not succeed at trial. Consequently, dismissal pursu-
ant to Rule 12(b)(6) was inappropriate." 29 In his concurrence, Jus-
21. Id. at 1345-46.
22. 227 A.2d 582 (R.I. 1967).
23. St. James, 676 A2d at 1346 (quoting Bragg, 227 A.2d at 584).
24. Id. at 1346 (citing Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849-50 (R.I.
1992)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1347. The complaint further alleged, in part, that the "building in-
spector had failed to examine plans and specifications... failed to make... proper
and thorough inspections, [and] negligently approved plans and specifications
which did not meet building code requirements.'" Id-
28. Id.
29. Id-
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tice Flanders somewhat softened the apparent harshness of this
ruling by emphasizing that although dismissal on the pleadings
may not be easily obtained where defendants plead the public-duty
doctrine, a motion for summary judgment may be an "expeditious
recourse short of trial to test whether a claim is barred by the pub-
lic-duty doctrine."30
CONCLUSION
While this case does not depart from the supreme court's prior
rulings on the issue of rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where defendant as-
serts immunity under the public-duty doctrine, it does appear to
signal that a defendant may be more likely to prevail in a motion
for summary judgment. State and municipal defendants should
probably avoid Rule 12(b)(6) motions unless the pleadings strongly
show the nonexistence of a public-duty exception. Defendants
might be better advised to seek a motion for summary judgment
after discovery, where extrinsic documentation would allow a mo-
tion judge a fuller examination of the record.
Lesley S. Rich
30. Id. (Flanders, J., concurring).
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